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This article compares the relevance to law of two unexpect-
edly similar fi elds: economics and behavioral biology. It fi rst 
examines the assumptions, core concepts, methodological 
tenets, and emphases of the two fi elds. It then compares the 
interdisciplinary fi elds of law and economics, on one hand, 
with law and behavioral biology, on the other—highlighting 
not only important similarities but also important differ-
ences. The article subsequently explores ways that biological 
perspectives on human behavior may, among other things, 
improve economic models and the behavioral insights they 
generate. The article concludes that although there are 
important differences between the two fi elds, the overlaps 
between economics and biology warrant even greater con-
gress between these two disciplines, and expanded exchange 
between the legal thinkers interested in each of them.
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1 Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 
100 Harv L Rev 761 (1987).
2 John Monahan, Could “Law and Evolution” be the Next “Law and Economics”?, 
8 Va J Soc Pol’y & L 123 (2000).
3 For a recent article exploring some of the “deeply resonant” thinking between law 
and biology and law and economics, see Morris B. Hoffman, Law and Biology, 8 J Phil, 
Sci & L (2008). For additional discussion of Monahan’s article, see David J. Herring, 
Legal Scholarship, Humility, and the Scientifi c Method, 25 Q L Rev 867 (2007).
4 See, for example, Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral 
Biology, 104 Colum L Rev 405 (2005); Paul Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. 
Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 Vanderbilt L Rev 1633 (2007); 
Erin Ann O’Hara, How Neuroscience Might Advance the Law, 359 Phil Trans R Soc 
Lond B 1677 (2004), reprinted as chapter 2 in Semir Zeki and Oliver Goodenough, eds, 
Law & the Brain 21 (Oxford 2006); Erin Ann O’Hara, Brain Plasticity and Spanish 
Moss in Biolegal Analysis, 53 Fla L Rev 905 (2001); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property 
‘Instinct’, 359 Phil Trans R Soc Lond B 1763 (2004), reprinted as chapter 10 in Law & 
the Brain 185; Jeffrey Evans Stake, Pushing Evolutionary Analysis of Law, 53 Fla L 
Rev 875 (2001).
Of course, we are not alone in this. Many have made, and continue to make, sig-
nifi cant contributions to each of these fi elds. Jones maintains a bibliography of many 
scholarly works at the intersection of Law and Biology on the website of The Society 
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL), online at http:// www .sealsite .org.
5 See, for example, Erin Ann O’Hara, The Economics of Confl ict of Laws (2 volume 
edited work, Edward Elgar 2007); Erin Ann O’Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and 
the Perennial Confl ict of Laws, 90 Geo L J 941 (2002); Erin Ann O’Hara & Larry E. Rib-
stein, From Politics to Effi ciency in Choice of Law, 67 U Chi L Rev 1151 (2000); Wil-
liam H. Allen & Erin A. O’Hara, Second Generation Law and Economics of Confl ict of 
Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 Stan L Rev 1011 (1999); Erin 
Ann O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Choice of Law/ Confl ict of Laws, in Gerritt de Geest, 
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
With the decline of law as an autonomous discipline,1 legal scholars 
have long sought ways to improve law by integrating insights from 
other fi elds. For the most part, these efforts have mined the social 
sciences, such as sociology, political science, and traditional psychol-
ogy. More recently, however, scholars have turned to the natural sci-
ences, including behavioral biology and neuroscience, in an effort to 
learn more about the multiple causal infl uences on human behaviors 
relevant to law.
Because law and economics is arguably the most successful of 
the “law and” intersections, it is inevitable that other interdisci-
plinary efforts will be compared to it. For example, several years ago 
John Monahan posed the question, in an article by this title, “Could 
“Law and Evolution” be the Next “Law and Economics”?2 We 
think the question warrants an extended examination and explicit 
answer.3 Each of us has worked for some years at the intersection 
of law and biology,4 at the intersection of law and economics,5 or 
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ed, Ghent Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2000); Erin Ann O’Hara 
& Francesco Parisi, Confl ict of Laws, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 
and the Law 387-96 (Macmillan 1998); Erin Ann O’Hara & William Dougan, Redis-
tribution Through Discriminatory Taxes: A Contractarian Explanation of the Role of 
the Courts, 6 Geo Mason L Rev 869 (1998); Erin Ann O’Hara & Richard S. Murphy, 
Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 S 
Ct Econ Rev 217 (1997); Erin Ann O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: 
Toward A Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 Seton Hall L Rev 736 (1993); 
Jeffrey E. Stake, Inheritance Law and Land Use Doctrines, 2 Peter Newman, ed, The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 311-21, 437-46 (Macmillan 
1998); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 Geo L J 2419 
(2001). In addition, Stake co-founded the Midwest Law and Economics Association 
with Thomas Ulen and Kenneth Dau- Schmidt.
6 Owen D. Jones, Time- Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behav-
ioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW U L Rev 1141 (2001); Owen D. 
Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endow-
ment Effect, 49 Wm & Mary L Rev 1935 (2008); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On 
Apology and Consilience, 77 Wash L Rev 1121 (2002); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Darwin, 
Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 Tulane L Rev 705-81 (1990); 
Jeffrey Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Liti-
gation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, chapter 17 in Paul H. Rubin, ed, The 
Evolution of Effi cient Common Law (Edward Elgar 2007), volume 3 in series Economic 
Approaches to Law (Richard A. Posner and Francesco Parisi, eds). In addition, each of 
us is a founding offi cer of the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law—the website 
is available online at http:// www .sealsite .org.
7 The economics used to enrich legal studies has been almost entirely limited to 
microeconomics. Because the movement is called “law and economics” and because 
“economics” is more compact than “microeconomics”, we shall use the term “eco-
nomics” even though “microeconomics” would be more accurate.
8 Alternatively referred to as “law and biology” (see, for example, programs of the 
Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research), “evolutionary analysis in law” 
(see, for example, Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and 
Application to Child Abuse, 75 NC L Rev 1117 (1997) and “law and evolution” (see, 
for example, Monahan (cited in note 2)). A further note on terminology: Behavioral 
biology comprises a wide variety of subdisciplines. Unless otherwise noted, the term 
as used here will refer to behavioral biology applied to the human context, which has 
overlaps with evolutionary psychology, evolutionary anthropology, behavioral ecol-
ogy, sociobiology, Darwinian medicine, behavioral genetics, and the like. We exclude, 
from this discussion, several other important subfi elds of behavioral biology such as 
psychopharmacology.
both.6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, we see similarities and differences in 
the two fi elds that suggest that the answer to Monahan’s question 
is: in some ways yes, and in some ways no.
We structure our approach as follows. Part II provides background 
information useful to the discussion in the remainder of the article. 
Part III compares microeconomics7 and biology generally. Part 
IV then compares law and economics, on one hand, with law and 
behavioral biology,8 on the other. These latter two Parts very briefl y 
compare the assumptions, core concepts, methodological tenets, 
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9 The population of every species can increase indefi nitely in number, unless 
checked by some scarcity—of food, space, mates, or the like. See Mark Ridley, Evolu-
tion 63 (3d ed, Blackwell Scientifi c 1993). In animals, this creates selection pressures 
that favor characteristics, including behavioral predispositions, that can aid survival 
and reproduction in conditions of scarcity. See generally, John Alcock, Animal Behav-
ior: An Evolutionary Approach (8th ed., Sinauer Associates 2005). And economics has 
been called “the study of the allocation of scarce means to satisfy competing ends.” 
Gary S. Becker, Economic Theory 1 (Knopf 1971).
and emphases of the fi elds of economics and behavioral biology, and 
then explore the infl uences of these and other similarities and differ-
ences on the development of the applied fi elds of law and economics 
and law and behavioral biology. Part V then further explores some 
ways in which biological perspectives can provide useful insights 
into human behavior by, among other things, improving economic 
models and the behavioral insights they generate. Finally, it provides 
advice to law and biology scholars seeking to avoid some of the criti-
cisms directed at law and economics.
Underlying our discussion below are two convictions. First, we 
believe that a deeper, more accurate, and biologically informed 
understanding of the relationships between biology, evolution, and 
human behavior might help legal thinkers pursue policy goals more 
effi ciently and effectively than they do at present. Law makers need 
sound models of when, why, and how people behave. And behavior 
is—though the product of many infl uences—a biological phenom-
enon. It emerges in non- random ways from a corporeal brain that 
is fl exible, subtle, plastic, and often self- conscious, on one hand, 
while being both anatomically and functionally specialized, on the 
other. Second, just as with law and economics generally—and with 
particular acknowledgment of the history of political mis- invocation 
of biology—potentially useful insights must be carefully mined and 
cautiously deployed.
I I .  C O N T E X T
This Part does two things. It addresses why behavioral biology and 
economics probably have more in common than do economics 
and any of the other interdisciplinary subfi elds to which it is often 
compared. And it provides a very brief overview of the relationship 
between economics and behavioral biology. Together, these provide 
background useful to the remainder of the article.
Biology and economics share, as a central concern, the effects of 
resource scarcity on behavior.9 Not surprisingly, then, the overlaps 
and interactions between economics and biology are long- standing 
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10 Thomas Malthus, Essay on the Principle of Population (Printed for J. Johnson 
1798).
11 Appearing as Charles Darwin, Autobiography, in F. Darwin, ed, The Life and Let-
ters of Charles Darwin 68 ( Murray1887), which contained the following passage:
In October 1838, that is, fi fteen months after I had begun my systematic 
enquiry, I happened to read for amusement ‘Malthus on Population,’ and being 
well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on 
from long- continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once 
struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to 
be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The results of this would 
be the formation of new species. Here, then I had at last got a theory by which 
to work. . . .
Some trace the infl uence of economics on Darwin’s work back even further, to encoun-
tering Adam Smith’s work in the early 1830s. See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould, The 
Structure of Evolutionary Theory 121-25 (Belknap 2002) (citing S.S. Schweber, The 
Origin of the Origin Revisitied, 10 J History Biol 229 (1977)).
12 Natural selection describes the result of systems combining reproduction, heri-
table traits, variations in those traits; and differential reproduction as a function of 
variation in heritable traits. See Ridley, at 63 (cited in note 12).
13 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Murray 1859).
and extensive. Perhaps the most famous and explicit interaction, 
however, was the infl uence of political economist Thomas Malthus 
on biologist Charles Darwin.
Malthus’ work pointed out that geometrically increasing popu-
lations could outgrow food supplies, leading to scarcity and famine.10 
Darwin read Malthus at a time (the year 1838, according to Darwin’s 
1876 autobiography11) when he was keenly prepared to appreciate and 
explore the consequences of this insight. And it helped provide the 
tool he needed to identify, name, and describe “natural selection”12 
as a major force in evolution.13 Darwin realized that when population 
growth can outstrip resources, and when more offspring are produced 
than can survive to reproduce themselves, any heritable variations 
in the traits of offspring that increase their chances of survival and 
eventual reproduction (compared to the chances of their contempo-
raries) will tend to appear in increasingly large percentages in subse-
quent generations. This means that individuals within a species can, 
over generations, come to look as if their traits were “designed” for 
effi cient operation within the ecological niches they inhabit.
Importantly, natural selection affects not only anatomical traits, 
but associated behavioral predispositions (tracing to anatomical 
traits of the nervous system) as well. From this perspective, animals 
can be considered choice machines—since the best anatomy in the 
world won’t help if you don’t deploy it in useful ways, at suitable 
times. At any given moment, the choice to forage, fl ee, scratch, 
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14 A good example of such hierarchical algorithms is the mating behavior of the 
male scorpionfl y, which has a preferred behavior, a backup behavior, and a backup-
 backup behavior, which it switches among in sequence as circumstances change. See 
Randy Thornhill, Rape in Panorpa Scorpionfl ies and a General Rape Hypothesis, 28 
Animal Behav 52 (1980).
15 Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not An Evolutionary Science?, Q J Econ 
373 (1898).
16 Alfred Lord Marshall, Principles of Economics Appdx C, 722 (Macmillan 1910, 
6th ed.).
17 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Milton Friedman, 
ed, Essays in Positive Economics 35 (Chicago 1953); Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, 
Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J Pol Econ 211 (1950).
drink, fi ght, sleep, seek a mate, strengthen cooperative alliances, 
or travel to another location may yield benefi ts, but at the cost of 
both invested energy and foregone benefi ts from alternative activi-
ties. Those organisms predisposed (typically though not exclusively 
through natural selection) to those behaviors (from among all pos-
sible behaviors) that increased the probabilities of survival and even-
tual reproduction more than do alternative behaviors “chosen” by 
other members of the species left more offspring, many of which 
would share these behavioral inclinations. Such inclinations are fre-
quently, of course, highly context- specifi c and condition- dependent. 
That is, evolutionary processes can equip an organism with “if- then” 
algorithms (often hierarchically ranked14) such that: if encountering 
environmental condition A, increase the probability of behaving in 
way Y; but if encountering condition B, increase the probability of 
behaving in way Z. And because the fi eld of economics is largely 
dedicated to the study of choice given particular costs and benefi ts, 
biologists naturally gravitated toward economic tools.
Important intellectual insights have fl owed in the other direc-
tion as well. For example, in 1898, the economist Thorstein Veblen 
famously asked, in the title of an article, “Why is economics not an 
evolutionary science?”15 And by the 1920’s, economist Alfred Lord 
Marshall argued that “[economics] is a branch of biology broadly 
interpreted.”16
Within a few decades thereafter, economists Milton Friedman 
and Armen Alchian had constructed powerful arguments for posi-
tive economic modeling of business behavior on the foundation of 
Darwin’s basic insight.17 Friedman and Alchian invoked Darwinian 
analysis (by analogy) to argue that businesses that make a profi t will 
survive in the market and those that do not will fail. When busi-
nesses fail, the labor and capital they employed are freed up for other 
uses, of which some will turn out to be more productive and others 
will, again, fail.
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18 Alchian, Uncertainty at 220 (cited in note 17).
19 A brief overview of some related history appears in the essay of Peter A. Corning, 
Evolutionary Economics: Metaphor or Unifying Paradigm?, 18 J of Soc & Evo Systems 
421 (1996) (reviewing two books on the intersection of economics and evolutionary 
biology).
20 See, for example, Robert L. Trivers, Parent- Offspring Confl ict, 14 Amer Zool 
249 (1974); John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge 
1982); Michael T. Ghiselin, Principles and Prospects for General Economy, in Gerard 
Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz, eds, Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach 
Applied Outside the Field of Economics (Paragon House 1987).
Thus, the market culls out unsuccessful businesses, those that 
employ resources ineffi ciently, leaving those that make more of 
resources. While the environment selects for business success, the 
evolutionary process is very often facilitated by business managers 
who consciously and unconsciously copy the operations of success-
ful businesses. The copies are often imperfect, both by design and 
inadvertence, and the resulting variations are subjected to selection 
on the criterion of effi ciency. To quote Alchian, the economist’s “ana-
lytical framework . . . is closely akin to the theory of biological evolu-
tion. The economic counterparts of genetic heredity, mutations, and 
natural selection are imitation, innovation, and positive profi ts.”18
Friedman and Alchian contended that, because Darwinian selec-
tion (or “adoption” to use Alchian’s word) is at work, economists 
need not worry about whether business managers make decisions by 
knowingly invoking the concepts used by economists. The behav-
ior of fi rms can be explained and predicted without examining the 
thoughts going through the heads of the managers.
This shared perspective of an environment selecting among varia-
tions led both economics and biology away from top- down expla-
nations and toward bottom-up understandings of complexity.19 
Extremely complex biological organisms exist not because they were 
designed by a creator attending to every detail but because waste-
ful characteristics are typically selected out of the countless random 
variations by the competition for resources. Likewise, extremely 
complex and coordinated economic markets can arise without the 
need for design by an all- knowing designer, merely by the competi-
tive actions of individual, atomistic actors.
The decades since these early interactions have been character-
ized by the convergence of the intellectual tools used in biology and 
economics, as indicated by the infl uential scholarship both from a 
number of biologists infl uenced by economics (such as Robert Triv-
ers, Maynard Smith, and Michael Ghiselin20) and from a number of 
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21 See, for example, Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Eco-
nomics and Sociobiology, 14 J Econ Lit 817 (1976); Jack Hirshleifer, Economics From 
A Biological Viewpoint, 20 J L & Econ 1 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Com-
mon Law Effi cient?, 6 J Leg Stud 51 (1977) reprinted in Paul Rubin, ed, The Evolution 
of Effi cient Common Law (Edward Elgar 2007); Robert Frank, Cooperation through 
Emotional Commitment, in Randolph Nesse, ed, Evolution and the Capacity for 
Commitment (Russell Sage Foundation 2001); Herbert Gintis, Game Theory Evolv-
ing (Princeton 2000).
22 Peter Hammerstein & Edward H. Hagen, The Second Wave Of Evolutionary 
Economics In Biology, 20 Trends in Ecology & Evolution 604, 604 (2005). As Mahoney 
and Sanchirico put it:
Evolutionary game theory grew out of an intellectual volley between theoretical 
biology and game theory. The history begins with an attempt by theoretical 
biologists John Maynard Smith and George Price to understand ritual combat 
within species. Unsatisfi ed with explanations provided by conventional evo-
lutionary theory, Maynard Smith and Price borrowed ideas from game theory, 
modifying the interpretation of key constructs to fi t the contours of animal 
evolution. A decade or so later, many game theorists became dissatisfi ed with 
the foundational assumptions underlying Nash equilibrium, in particular the 
requisite assumption that players somehow know what their opponents are 
going to do. In seeking explanations for the genesis of this common understand-
ing of strategic intent, game theorists turned to the concepts of learning and 
evolution, thus borrowing back Maynard Smith and Price’s earlier adaptation 
of the game form to animal evolution. The result is the fi eld of evolutionary 
game theory.
Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is 
the Fittest Norm Effi cient?, 149 U Pa L Rev 2027, 2039-40 (2001).
23 Id at 604.
24 For one view of these interactions, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Taxonomizing the 
Relationship Between Biology and Economics: A Very Long Engagement, 9 J Bioecon 
169 (2007).
economists infl uenced by biology (such as Gary Becker, Jack Hirsh-
leifer, Paul Rubin, Robert Frank, and Herbert Gintis21). For instance, 
in developing theories of optimal foraging and ritual combat, John 
Maynard Smith and George Price borrowed heavily from economic 
game theory and built on it, and then economists borrowed back, 
incorporating evolutionary game theory.22 And in recent years, 
economists and biologists have moved beyond borrowing from each 
other to working together, yielding advances on both empirical and 
theoretical fronts.23
The combined infl uence of biologists thinking economically and 
economists thinking biologically has lead to interesting and increas-
ing interdisciplinary endeavors, evident from even a casual glance 
through economic and biological literatures.24 To give just a brief fl a-
vor of this:
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25 See, for example, Michael T. Ghiselin, A Bibliography for Bioeconomics, 2 J 
Bioecon 233 (2000); Ulrich Witt, Bioeconomics as Economics from a Darwinian Per-
spective, 1 J Bioecon 19 (1999); Janet Tai Landa & Michael T. Ghiselin, The Emerging 
Discipline Of Bioeconomics: Aims And Scope Of The Journal Of Bioeconomics, 1 J 
Bioecon 5 (2004); Michael T. Ghiselin, Biology, Economics, and Bioeconomics, in Uni-
versal Economics 71 (Paragon House 1992). It is currently unclear whether this term 
has independently re- arisen, or is a resurfaced descendant of some scattered earlier 
usages. The present use of “bioeconomics” should be distinguished from a prior, tem-
porarily fl oated use, from the 1970s, when “bioeconomics” referred to, for example, 
“tak[ing] fuller account of man’s use of energy in economic activities.” Georgescu: A 
Prophet of Energy Economics, Business Week, March 24, 1975, Industrial Edition. On 
the other hand, it seems similar to the usage of the term in a 1913 work, the earliest we 
can locate to use the term: Herman Reinheimer, Evolution by Co- operation: A Study 
in Bio- Economics (Dutton 1913). The earliest example we have located of the term’s 
use in a science journal is William Borberg, Men and Their Sciences, 122 Science 
183, 185 (July 29, 1955). The earliest example we have located of the term’s use in an 
economics journal is: Nicholas Georgescu- Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths, 41 S 
Econ J 347, 369 (1975) (reporting that the term was fi rst seen in a letter (date uncertain) 
from Jiri Zeman).
26 See, for example, http:// www .economyprofessor .com/ economictheories/ bionom
ics .php.
27 See, for example, Ulrich Witt’s entry on Evolutionary Economics in The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, online at http:// www .dictionaryofeconomics 
.com/ article?id=pde2008_E000295; David Boyce Hamilton, Evolutionary Econom-
ics: A Study of Change in Economic Thought (Transaction 1991); Gerhard Hanappi, 
Evolutionary Economics: The Evolutionary Revolution in the Social Sciences (Alder-
shot 1994); John Laurent & John Nightingale, eds, Darwinism and Evolutionary 
Economics (Edward Elgar 2001); Jack Vromen, Conjectural Revisionary Economic 
Ontology: Outline of an Ambitious Research Agenda for Evolutionary Economics, 
11 J Econ Methodology 213 (2004). See also, Thorbjorn Knudsen, Economic Selection 
Theory, 12 J Evolutionary Econ 443 (2002); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Darwinism in Eco-
nomics: From Analogy to Ontology, 12 J Evolutionary Econ 259 (2002); Trenton G. 
Smith & Attila Tasnadi, A Theory of Natural Addiction, 59 Games & Econ Behav 
316 (2007).
The fi rst mention we can locate of the term “evolutionary economics” is in an 
American Naturalist listing of programs at the World’s Columbian Exposition of 
1893. One program is there titled “Some American Problems of Evolutionary Eco-
nomics.” The fi rst full article we can locate using the term is Veblen’s in 1898 (cited in 
note 15).
Somewhat confusingly, there is another use of the term “evolutionary economics,” 
somewhat unrelated to the use described here. See, for example, An Association for 
Evolutionary Economics, online at http:// www .afee .net/.
28 Paul W. Glimcher, Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuro-
economics (MIT 2002); C. Camerer, et al, Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can 
Inform Economics, J Econ Lit 9 (March 2005).
• Recent years have seen the emergence of hybrid terms such 
as “bioeconomics”25 (sometimes “bionomics”26), “evolution-
ary economics,”27 and “neuroeconomics.”28
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29 Contents of this journal, which began publication in 1999, can be viewed online 
at http:// www .springerlink .com/ content/ 1573-6989/.
30 Contents of this journal, started in 1991, can be viewed online at http:// www 
.springerlink .com/ content/ 1432-1386/ ?p=aeaa69a117ac44de8e30358e764e2118
&p_o=51.
31 See mentions online at http:// www .springerlink .com/ content/ g262n873318671
wg/ fulltext .pdf and http:// www .springer .com/ west/ home/ economics/ journals?SGW
ID=4-40532-70-35644198-0.
32 Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics, online at http:// www .econ
.kyoto- u.ac.jp/ %7Eevoeco/.
33 Jack Hirshleifer, Economics From A Biological Viewpoint, 20 J L & Econ 1 
(1977); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation 
Versus Confl ict Strategies, 4 Research L & Econ 1 (1982); Jack Hirshleifer, Competi-
tion, Cooperation, and Confl ict in Economics and Biology, 68 Econ & Bio 238 (May 
1978); Michael T. Ghiselin, The Economy of the Body, 68 Econ & Bio 233 (May 1978); 
Michael T. Ghiselin, Darwin, Progress, and Economic Principles, 49 Evolution 1029 
(1995); David J. Rapport & James Turner, Economic Models in Ecology, 195 Science 
367 (1977); Donald T. Campbell, Rationality and Utility from the Standpoint of Evo-
lutionary Biology, 59 J Business S355 (1986); Hammerstein & Hagen, (cited in note 25); 
Ulrich Witt, Economics, Sociobiology, and Behavioral Psychology on Preferences, 12 J 
of Econ Psych 557 (1991); Arthur J. Robson, The Biological Basis of Economic Behav-
ior, 39 J of Econ Lit 11 (2001); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Sociobiology, Culture 
and Economic Theory, 1 J Econ Behav & Org 97 (1980); Larry Samuelson & Jeroen 
Swinkels, Information, Evolution and Utility, 1 Theoretical Econ 119 (2006); Larry 
Samuelson, Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies, 97 J of Econ Theory 320 (2001); 
Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, Evolutionary Effi ciency and Happiness, 115 J Political 
Econ 302 (2007); Herbert Gintis, A Framework for the Unifi cation of the Behavioral 
Sciences, 30 Behavioral & Brain Sciences 1 (2007); Hoffman, Law and Biology (cited 
in note 3); Donald Cox, Biological Basics and the Economics of the Family, 21 J of 
Econ Perspectives 91 (2007); Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Thorbjørn Knudsen, In Search of 
General Evolutionary Principles: Why Darwinism is Too Important to be Left to the 
Biologists, 10 J Bioeconomics 51 (2008); Bart Du Laing, Equality in Exchange Revis-
ited: From an Evolutionary (Genetic and Cultural) Point of View, in Law, Mind and 
Brain 267 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds, Ashgate 2009); Bart Du 
Laing, Dual Inheritance Theory, Contract Law, and Institutional Change? Towards 
the Co- evolution of Behavior and Institutions, 9 German L J 491(2008). See also Felix 
Hoffl er, Why Humans Care About Sunk Costs While Animals Don’t: An Evolution-
ary Perspective, MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2005/17, online at SSRN: http:// 
ssrn .com/ abstract=808884.
• There are new journals such as the Journal of Bioeconomics29 
and the Journal of Evolutionary Economics.30
• There is an international trend toward academic societies 
that join these disciplines, such as the International Society 
for Bioeconomics,31 and the Japan Association for Evolution-
ary Economics.32
• There are many signifi cant journal articles—such as Eco-
nomics from a Biological Viewpoint and Economic Models 
in Ecology and Law and Biology—that explicitly tie biology 
and economics together.33
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34 Reinhard Selten, Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior, 3 Games and 
Economic Behavior 3 (1991).
35 See, for example, Michael T. Ghiselin, Principles and Prospects for General 
Economy, in Gerard Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz, eds, Economic Imperialism: The 
Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field of Economics (Paragon House 1987).
36 See, for example, Arthur E. Gandolfi , et al, Economics as Evolutionary Science: 
From Utility to Fitness (Transaction 2002). Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Economics and 
Evolution: Bringing Life Back into Economics (Michigan 1993). Michael T. Ghiselin, 
The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex (California 1974); Paul Seabright, 
The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life (Princeton 2004); 
Peter Koslowski, ed, Sociobiology and Bioeconomics: The Theory of Evolution in 
Biological and Economic Theory (Springer 1999); Eric D. Beinhocker, The Origin of 
Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Economics (Harvard 
Business School 2006); Haim Ofek, Second Nature: Economic Origins of Human Evo-
lution (Cambridge 2001).
37 Jack J. Vromen, Taking Evolution Seriously: What Difference Does it Make for 
Economics?, in John Davis, et al, eds, The Elgar Companion to Economics and Phi-
losophy 102, 103 (Edward Elgar 2004); Richard W. England, Evolutionary Concepts in 
Contemporary Economics (Michigan 1994).
38 See generally, Kevin N. Laland & Gillian R. Brown, Sense and Nonsense: Evolu-
tionary Perspectives on Human Behaviour (Oxford 2002).
• Similarly, there are numerous book chapters—such as Prin-
ciples and Prospects for General Economy and Evolution, 
Learning, and Economic Behavior34—that do the same.35
• And there have been a number of full- length books on the 
subject—such as Economics as An Evolutionary Science: 
From Utility to Fitness and Sociobiology and Bioeconomics: 
The Theory of Evolution in Biological and Economic Theory 
and Second Nature: Economic Origins of Human Evolu-
tion—exploring the overlaps of, and useful cross- fertilization 
between, economics and biology.36
To be sure, interdisciplinary scholars in either of these fi elds will 
disagree over the implications of the other fi eld’s insights. As Jack 
Vromen describes, economists working with evolutionary theory 
have broken themselves into three camps. One camp believes 
that incorporating evolutionary theory into economics requires no 
change in standard economic theory. A second camp thinks that the 
basic structure of economic theory can remain intact, but details 
differ when evolutionary theory is used. A third camp thinks that 
evolutionary insights necessitate a complete revision of economic 
theory.37 Moreover, economists interested in behavioral biology can 
confront a diversity of existing evolutionary approaches,38 just as 
biologists interested in economics can confront competing views of 
economic theory.
Nevertheless, all of these developments, historical and current, 
reveal that the connections between economics and biology are 
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39 Hoffman, Law and Biology at 1 (cited in note 3).
40 See, for example, Daniel Nettle, reviewing Economics as an Evolutionary 
Science, 3 Human Nature Rev 21 (2003).
41 Gordon Tullock, Some Personal Refl ections on the History of Bioeconomics, 1 
J of Bioecon 13 (1999).
42 See generally, Alcock (cited in note 9); David D. Barash, The Survival Game 
Theory Explains the Biology of Cooperation and Competition (Henry Holt 2004).
43 Our main purpose in this article is to explore comparisons rather than applica-
tions. There are a variety of existing applications, however. For example, one arc of 
research laid a theoretical foundation (“time- shifted rationality”) for linking behav-
ioral biology and economics in the law- relevant context of “endowment effects,” then 
tested predictions of that foundation, and used the close fi t between predictions and 
data to develop a new theory of endowment effects. See Time- Shifted Rationality and 
the Law of Law’s Leverage (cited in note 6); S.F. Brosnan, et al, Endowment Effects in 
Chimpanzees, 17 Current Bio. 1704 (2007); Jones & Brosnan, (cited in note 6).
44 As should be clear from the foregoing, we are by no means the only scholars to 
explore various conceptual relationships between the two fi elds. See, for example, 
scholars cited in notes 20, 21, 33-35; Hoffman (cited in note 3); Hodgson, Bringing 
Life Back (cited in note 36); Hodgson, Taxonomy (cited in note 24); Vromen, Taking 
Evolution Seriously (cited in note 37); Hammerstein & Hagen (cited in note 22); R.R. 
Nelson & S.G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Belknap 1982); 
Paul Krugman, What Economists Can Learn from Evolutionary Theorists—and Vice 
Versa, in John Groenewegen & Jack Vromen, eds, Institutions and the Evolution 
of Capitalism: Implications of Evolutionary Economics (Edward Elgar 1999) (1996 
lecture to the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy), online at: 
http:// web.mit .edu/ krugman/ www/ evolute .html.
deep, substantial, “deeply resonant” (in the words of Morris Hoff-
man39), and increasingly noticed.40 In sum, the deep structural rela-
tionship between economics and biology stems from the fact that 
both fi elds focus on maximizing outcomes in the face of scarcity and 
uncertainty.41 And, when scarcity becomes relevant to survival and 
reproduction, natural selection will (all else equal) favor those who 
economize.42 This has inevitable implications for the ways behav-
ior—including behavior relevant to law43—is analyzed.
I I I .  E C O N O M I C S  A N D  B I O L O G Y
The fi rst step in comparing law and economics with law and behav-
ioral biology is to compare economics and behavioral biology inde-
pendent of law.44
A. Similarities
Beyond the fact that both fi elds deal with successful strategies for 
coping with scarcity, economics and behavioral biology are similar 
in many other, more specifi c ways. This section quickly surveys a 
variety of examples.
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45 The fi elds of biology and economics do differ, however, in the extent to which 
this assumption is invoked. It is more universally invoked in biology. Hirshleifer dis-
cusses this distinction in Hirshleifer, at 4 (cited in note 21).
46 There is some debate in biology whether the unit of selection is the gene exclu-
sively, or alternatively the gene, individual, group, or species, depending on context. 
See Ridley, at Chapter 12 (cited in note 9). The two extremes can be surveyed in 
Richard Dawkins, The Selfi sh Gene (Oxford 1976) and D.S. Wilson & E. O. Wilson, 
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology, 82 Q Rev Biology 327 (2007), 
though most biologists continue to subscribe to the former of these two views. See 
Ridley, at 310-15 (cited in note 9). On the extent to which biological self interest and 
altruism toward kin, friends, or strangers can be reconciled, see Timothy H. Gold-
smith & William F. Zimmerman, Biology, Evolution, and Human Nature 126-38 
(Wiley 2001).
47 For a basic description, see Gary S. Becker, Economic Theory 4-7 (Knopf 1971).
48 For a basic description, see Trivers, Social Evolution 15-17 (Benjamin Cummings 
Publishing Co. 1985). For further explanation, see Ridley, at 263-350 (cited in note 9).
At the most basic (and most obvious) level, the central subject 
matter of both economics and behavioral biology is behavior. Note 
that in their approaches to behavior, both economics and biology 
assume that organisms can move toward optimal behavioral out-
comes without focused, prior, cognitive deliberation.45
In studying behavior, both economics and biology seek to under-
stand the mulitiple infl uences on behavior, and both fi elds are gen-
erally interested in generating probabilistic but general predictions 
about how most actors within large populations will behave. In 
generating these predictions, both disciplines begin with an assump-
tion that, by and large,46 individuals behave in ways that refl ect self-
 interest (often streamlined down to wealth and reproductive success, 
respectively) and that groups therefore tend to behave in ways that 
refl ect aggregated self- interest of constituent individuals. Moreover, 
because each fi eld seeks to understand how scarce resources (includ-
ing time and energy) can be effi ciently allocated, each focuses on the 
extent to which behavioral inclinations vary as environments vary. 
In short, predicted behaviors are often context- specifi c.
As in many other fi elds, analyses in both economics and behavioral 
biology tend to begin with simple, generally-accessible concepts that 
are capable of yielding useful insights into their studied subjects. For 
instance, one of the central ideas in economics is that price is a func-
tion of supply and demand.47 If demand for a good increases, price will 
rise; if supply increases, price will fall. And one of the central ideas in 
behavioral biology—natural selection—is that, in a world of varying 
heritable traits, those that increase reproductive success more than 
others tend to appear in increasing proportions in subsequent genera-
tions of individuals.48
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49 Walter Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions 755 
(Dryden, 3d ed, 1985). There are two types of elasticity, depending on the size of the 
change in price. It is called “point elasticity” when the change in price is infi nitesi-
mally small and “arc elasticity” when the change in price is larger than that. The arc 
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of measuring the arc elasticity.
50 On a slanted straight demand curve, the coeffi cient of elasticity varies from infi n-
ity (minus infi nity, but we ignore the minus sign) for an infi nitely small change at the 
vertical axis intercept where quantity demanded is zero, to zero for an infi nitesimal 
change at the horizontal axis intercept where price per unit is zero. Elasticity coeffi -
cients calculated for points or arcs at prices below the midpoint are below one, which 
is called “inelastic,” while elasticity coeffi cients above the midpoint are above one, 
which is called “elastic.” (The elasticity coeffi cient at the midpoint is precisely one.) 
For a treatment of the concept of elasticity, see Nicholson, at 172-82 (cited in note 49).
However, each fi eld also contains subtle complexities that can 
confound newcomers. Take, for example, the important but non-
 obvious distinction in economics between “slopes” and “elastici-
ties” of demand (or supply) curves. Both the slope and the elasticity of 
the demand curve measure the change in demand as price changes. In 
common shorthand, the two terms are used interchangeably, with a 
steeper demand curve also being described as less elastic. This usage 
is accurate in the two limiting cases, where perfect inelasticity is the 
same as a vertical demand curve and, at the other extreme, where 
infi nite elasticity is the same as a horizontal demand curve. But elas-
ticity and slope are not the same in cases between those extremes. 
The slope of a demand or supply curve is defi ned as the change in 
price divided by the corresponding change in quantity. If the price 
decreases by $1 and demand increases by 10 units, the slope is 1/10. 
If the price decreases by 1 dollar and demand increases by 1 unit, 
the slope is 1/1, or 1. The price elasticity of demand, by contrast, is 
defi ned as the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by 
the corresponding percentage change in price.49 If the price decreases 
from $5 to $4 and demand increases from 2 to 3 units, the elastic-
ity is .5/-.2. When the “curve” is a slanted straight line, the slope 
will be the same at all prices but the elasticity will not.50 If the price 
decreases from $5 to $4 to $3 while the number demanded increases 
from 2 to 3 to 4 units, the slope is 1 and the elasticity (under one 
defi nition) is .5/-.2 for the fi rst decrease and .33/-.25 for the second 
decrease of a dollar in the price. Consequently, the slope varies as a 
function of measurement units, while the elasticity does not. If, in 
the example above, the units were dozens of items and the change in 
the number demanded is described as a change from 24 to 36 items 
instead of from 2 to 3 dozen, the slope is 1/12 instead of 1, but the 
elasticity remains at .5/-.2.
To take but one example of often- overlooked complexity in biol-
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H. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Human Nature: Forging Links Between Evolu-
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52 See generally, Douglas Futuyma, Evolution (Sinauer Associates 2005). For discus-
sion, see Todd Zywicki, Evolutionary Psychology and the Social Sciences,13 Humane 
Studies Rev, Issue 1 (Fall 2000).
53 See generally, S.A. West, et al, Social Semantics: Altruism, Cooperation, Mutual-
ism, Strong Reciprocity and Group Selection, 20 J Evol Biol 415 (2007).
54 For a brief discussion of the problems created when multiple equilibria are pos-
sible, see, Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and 
the Law 39 (Harvard 1994).
55 See generally, Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 16 (Pearson 
Addison Wesley, 4th ed 2004) (describing relationship between equilibrium and maxi-
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ogy, people often assume that “fi tness” can be measured by count-
ing offspring. While this measure is certainly helpful, determining 
fi tness is actually a bit more subtle. “Inclusive fi tness” takes into 
account the varying probability—according to degrees of consan-
guinity—that copies of genes will appear in near relatives other than 
offspring, such as siblings, cousins, and nieces and nephews.51 Thus, 
and counterintuitively, there are some circumstances in which an in-
dividual could increase her fi tness by limiting her own reproductive 
efforts (and thus offspring) and using the saved resources to increase 
the reproduction of genetic relatives. Fitness is a subtle concept in 
other ways, too. “Fitness” is relative, not absolute. It can be mea-
sured only with respect to a given environment. If the environment 
changes, what is “fi tter” will change as well.52 Subtle complexities 
in the concepts of altruism, mutualism, cooperation, reciprocity, and 
group selection can also confuse newcomers.53
Because each fi eld uses models to predict behavior and, conversely, 
uses observed behavior to help test its models, identifying equilib-
rium behavior is important in each fi eld. Without either a single 
or relatively small fi nite number of equilibria, a model’s predictive 
usefulness is signifi cantly hampered.54 In each fi eld, the equilibrium 
sought is the solution to a constrained maximization problem.55 In 
both fi elds, the subject studied, if acting in her self interest, will 
maximize the value of desired outcomes. However, in both fi elds, 
the subjects also are assumed to be constrained by scarcity. Evolu-
tionary processes (including natural selection, the oldest economiz-
ing force in the history of life) tend to favor heritable behaviors that 
maximize reproductive success, given limited intelligence, strength, 
material resources, and the like. Correspondingly, fi rms survive and 
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Fernandez, Game Theory with Economic Applications (Addison- Wesley 1993); Eric 
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Game Theory and Animal Behavior (Oxford 2000). For a crossover work, by an econo-
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Theory Evolving: A Problem- Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Behavior 
(Princeton 2000).
58 With zero- sum games, one player loses what another gains, so the players are 
naturally competing with one another to obtain gains and avoid losses. With posi-
tive sum games, some outcomes will benefi t both parties. To help obtain that 
mutual benefi t, the parties are more inclined toward cooperation. See Scott Gates & 
Brian D. Humes, Games, Information and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models 
to Political Science 2 & n 4 (Michigan 1997) (discussing distinction between zero sum 
and positive sum games).
grow if they are better at maximizing profi ts than their competitors, 
given costly human and physical capital.56 Understanding the effects 
of scarcity is essential for identifying any interesting equilibrium 
behavior.
In both fi elds, subjects studied interact with others. In modeling 
behavior, then, it becomes necessary to incorporate a method for 
studying strategic interactions. So both fi elds draw at times on game 
theory for insights.57 In both fi elds, interactions are sometimes one-
 time interactions and other times are iterated, and optimal behaviors 
tend to vary depending upon which type of interaction people encoun-
ter. Moreover, some environments and situations render competi-
tive strategies more successful than cooperative strategies, and vice 
versa. For instance, at its most basic level, zero- sum game settings 
tend to produce competition, while positive- sum game settings are 
more likely to produce cooperation.58 So each fi eld has endeavored to 
sort and study the two types of strategies separately.
Cooperation enables animals, human and nonhuman, to achieve 
better outcomes, and it can enable them to compete more effectively 
with others. Economists typically study cooperation in the form of 
exchange, while biologists typically study cooperation as a form of 
mutualism, aid to kin, and reciprocal altruism. In both fi elds, though, 
stable cooperation is assumed to be in the self interest of all of its par-
ticipants. In both fi elds, cooperation sometimes enables its partici-
pants to specialize, and specialization increases the total welfare for 
the participants by enabling them to reap larger gains and to do so at 
relatively smaller total expenditures of effort.
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Interactions, whether cooperative or competitive, are complex and 
messy in the real world. However, each discipline has found ways 
to generate equilibrium self- interested behavior without knowing 
everything there is to know about a given decision. One way to con-
front this complexity is to build uncertainty into the decision making 
environment.59 How should an organism respond, given limited, or 
asymmetric information? Another strategy for confronting complex-
ity is to count on spontaneous coordination or order to result from 
multiple actions within each individual’s self- interest. Economists 
study spontaneous order in the forms of markets and industries, 
while biologists study such order arising within social groups, and 
occasionally within or between species. Consequently, scholars in 
both economics and biology gain insights into complex phenomena 
by focusing on the aggregated effects of the behaviors of individuals.
Both economics and biology examine short- term changes in behav-
ior that result from an exogenous change in the environment and 
long- term, domino effects on the behaviors of other actors and the 
actor herself.60 One consequence of this separate analysis is that in 
both fi elds scholars are likely to distinguish carefully between behav-
iors that satisfy one’s short- term interests and behaviors that serve 
one’s long- term interests. In both fi elds, investment is a primary 
mechanism by which one trades off short- term and long- term bene-
fi ts. Investing in college, or in a friendship, or in a business enterprise 
refl ects short term costs in the form of forgone consumption oppor-
tunities. But that investment can yield long- term income or other 
benefi ts that prove to be far more valuable. From a biological perspec-
tive, animals often invest in offspring in ways that reduce the number 
of offspring one rears, while increasing their quality for future mating 
competition. Or they may invest in a social alliance that costs now, 
but may yield essential benefi ts later. From an inclusive fi tness per-
spective, such behaviors may be optimal in the long run.
Models in both fi elds take account of the variety of ways that 
changes can arise. For example, a fi rm’s fortunes may improve 
through conscious innovation, accidental discovery, or random mis-
fortune (such as a hurricane) befalling a competitor. Analogously, 
in biology, an organism may out- compete its contemporaries as a 
consequence of some new benefi cial genetic mutation, some bene-
fi cial new recombination of existing genes, or bad luck encountered 
by competitors.
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ture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago 2004); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, 
The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (Oxford 2005); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, 
Sociobiology, Culture and Economic Theory, 1 J Econ Behav & Org 97 (1980) (arguing 
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63 See, for example, Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in 
Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 3-43 (Chicago 1935) (the ultimate goal 
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64 It should be noted here that Friedman, for one, argued that examination of the 
validity of the assumptions was not a particularly important occupation. Id.
In addition, both fi elds consider ways in which effi cient behavior 
tends to survive and repeat or reappear. In economics, this repetition 
may manifest within a person, a fi rm, or an industry. It may also 
manifest across persons, fi rms, and industries. When it manifests, 
depending on context, repetition may be a function of one or more of 
the following: observed and evaluated effects of accident or innova-
tion; simple imitation of others; learning from observing and analyz-
ing the behaviors of others; mere continuation of things that have 
not yet resulted in disaster.61 In biology, the repetition of interest 
is ordinarily trans- generational (though there are exceptions), and 
these are ordinarily tabulated in copies of genes (which, all else being 
equal, will increase proportionally over generations when inclining 
organisms toward effi cient behaviors). However, human behavioral 
biology also accommodates the extent to which cultural infl uences 
and evolved cognitive capacities can enable people either to identify 
and deliberatively choose effi cient behavior, or to imitate it for rea-
sons of cultural relatedness, independent of genetic relatedness.62
The methodological tenets of the fi elds are similar and appealing 
to outsiders. As sciences, both fi elds aspire to creating hypotheses 
that are useful in predicting empirical observations.63 And scholars in 
each share a desire to generate models that are both internally consis-
tent and consistent with one another. On one hand, this consistency 
contributes to conceptual elegance in both fi elds. On the other, it 
sometimes impedes in both fi elds the ability to closely analyze the 
validity of the assumptions that tend to underlie many long- standing 
models.64
Economics and behavioral biology are both easily (and in fact 
commonly) caricatured with straw- men attacks and both confront 
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see also, Abner J. Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice: Foreword, 74 
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of Irrational Behavior (Stanford 2005); Christine Jolls, et al, A Behavioral Approach to 
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supposed “refutations” constructed on the basis of a single example 
when of course no one in either fi eld would contend that their theory 
describes or predicts the behavior of everyone. And the two fi elds 
have in common at least two charges from critics. First, each has 
been accused of being inherently politically conservative (or at least 
too- easily playing into the hands of conservatives).65 This tends to 
make conservative audiences too receptive, and liberal audiences too 
skeptical. Second, each has been accused of being too reductionistic.66 
This charge provides cover for those who claim that human behavior 
is simply too complex to make the study of economic or biological 
infl uences on human behavior worthwhile.
Some of the core challenges for both fi elds are similar, in that each 
discipline must at one time or another confront behavioral complex-
ity in the form of seemingly irrational or maladaptive behavior.67 
For instance, both altruistic and spiteful behaviors require explana-
tion and reconciliation with the underlying theories.68 Moreover, in 
the human contexts that concern us here, each discipline confronts 
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(though often by different names) a variety of cognitive biases and 
heuristics that—at least at fi rst—seem paradoxical given the main 
theoretical understructure. Common examples include hyperbolic 
discounting, endowment effects, hindsight bias, confi rmation bias, 
and categorization by elimination.69
These similarities explain why the literatures in economics 
and behavioral biology often resonate with one another, and why 
biologists and economists are frequently drawn to each other’s dis-
ciplines.
B. Differences
Notwithstanding the important similarities just briefl y described, 
there are a number of signifi cant differences between economics and 
behavioral biology. These differences, surveyed briefl y in this sec-
tion, can at times limit the usefulness of each discipline to the other. 
However, some of the differences actually suggest synergistic bene-
fi ts that can be obtained through cross- fertilization.
The methods of the two disciplines differ in an important, thresh-
old way. Economics is embedded within social science traditions, 
while behavioral biology is embedded within life science traditions. 
As a consequence, economists and biologists differ in training, tools, 
techniques, and even vocabulary. And these differences can cause 
scholars in the two fi elds to talk past one another or to at least ini-
tially overlook the merits of one another’s advances.70
Historically, economics has focused primarily on humans, and 
only rarely and recently has ventured into non- human contexts. The 
reverse sequence is true for behavioral biology, which historically 
focused on nonhumans, and then gradually extended into human 
contexts. As a consequence, economists often overlook the extent 
to which human choices can be contextualized within the behav-
ioral choices and tendencies of animals generally. By missing these 
connections, economists also can miss the implications for how an 
understanding of natural selection can deepen our understanding of 
human behavior. Conversely, biologists are sometimes uncomfort-
able plying their skills beyond non- human species, not only because 
humans are more behaviorally complex, and their behavioral biology 
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Becker & William M. Landes, eds, Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 
(National Bureau of Economic Research 1974).
72 See, for example, Randolph M. Nesse, ed, Evolution and the Capacity for Com-
mitment (Russell Sage Foundation 2001).
73 See, for example, Paul H. Rubin & Chris W. Paul II, An Evolutionary Model of 
Taste for Risk, 17 Econ Inquiry 585 (1979); Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes 
(Harvard 1996).
more politically controversial, but also because humans were simply 
exempted, for a long period of the history of the discipline, from the 
spectrum of the animal kingdom that biologists were trained to 
investigate.
With respect to particular foci of study, economics is concerned 
principally with market behavior (with some extensions into non-
 market behavior71), while behavioral biology is focused principally 
on non- market behaviors (with some extensions into market behav-
iors72). Even where their analytic tools are similar, then, scholars in 
the two fi elds are not always interested in using those tools to explore 
the same questions.
Moreover, even when they are focused on the same market or non-
 market human behaviors, the canonical inquiries within the disci-
plines also vary signifi cantly. Economists are mostly concerned with 
the “how” questions—such as how people are likely to respond to 
particular costs and benefi ts, given assumptions about their prefer-
ences. In other words, and ignoring important exceptions,73 econo-
mists usually treat preferences as exogenous, and are often loathe to 
explore either those preferences or their sources. Behavioral biolo-
gists are similarly concerned with these “how” questions, but their 
interests extend beyond them. Once organisms within a species are 
known to behave according to a particular set of preferences, biolo-
gists then ask “why” they may have those preferences. This natu-
rally leads to consideration of evolutionary processes, including the 
effects of natural selection on behavioral predispositions.
To the economist, behavior reveals preferences. Future behavior 
can be predicted from those preferences, regardless of origins, which 
seem needless if preferences are clear and predictions confi rmed. 
These differing perspectives may usefully join, however, since people 
have differing, sometimes competing preferences, and an inquiry into 
the source of those preferences can better help us pick and choose 
between preference possibilities to better predict behavior. For ex-
ample, what environmental factors, perceived by a brain evolved 
to incline behavior in different ways in reaction to different envi-
ronmental conditions, will increase the probability of cooperative 
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74 For an early attempt to explore these questions, see Rubin & Paul (cited in 
note 73).
75 For discussion of these central concepts, see Alcock, Animal Behavior, at 2-6 
(cited in note 9); Goldsmith, at 6-11 (cited in note 51); John Alcock & Paul Sherman, 
The Utility of the Proximate- Ultimate Dichotomy in Ethology, 96 Ethology 58 (1994); 
Ernst Mayr, Cause and Effect in Biology, 134 Science 1501 (1961).
76 See Time- Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage (cited in note 6).
77 See, for example, Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experi-
encing the Future, 317 Science 1351 (2007).
78 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 469-70 (L.A. Selby- Bigge & 
P.H. Nidditch, eds, Oxford, 2d ed 1978) (1740); and G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica 90 
(Thomas Baldwin, ed, Cambridge rev ed 1993). We recognize that some object to the 
merging of Moore’s “naturalistic fallacy” with Hume’s “is- ought” distinction. See 
William H. Bruening, Moore and Is- Ought, 81 Ethics 143 (1971) (discussing whether 
the naturalistic fallacy and the is- ought distinction are the same). We are also aware 
that it is technically possible to derive ought from is in some narrowly- defi ned cir-
cumstances. Nonetheless, it is often a mark of defective reasoning. For arguments 
that biologists have paid too much attention to the naturalistic fallacy and too little 
attention to evolutionary ethics, see D. Wilson, et al, On the Inappropriate Use of 
the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology, 18 Bio & Phil 669 (2003); Oliver 
Curry, Who’s Afraid Of The Naturalistic Fallacy?, 4 Evol Psychol 234 (2006); Alex 
Walter, The Anti- Naturalistic Fallacy: Evolutionary Moral Psychology and the Insis-
tence of Brute Facts, 4 Evol Psychol 33 (2006).
behavior, or competitive behavior? When and where are we likely to 
observe risky behavior?74
Insights into questions such as these may often benefi t from sus-
tained inquiry into both the how and the why questions. (Biologists 
distinguish these, respectively, as the necessarily complementary 
“proximate,” mechanistic questions on one hand and the “ultimate,” 
evolutionary history questions on the other.75) Moreover, a concern 
with the source of tastes may at times give behavioral biology an 
advantage for legal analyses. Attention to the sources of tastes allows 
not only consideration of how to change choices by changing prices, 
it also allows anticipation of the varying diffi culties law or other 
nonmonetary pressures may encounter when attempting either to 
change the tastes themselves or to alter behavior refl ecting those 
tastes.76 Finally, preferences about future states invoke brain pro-
cesses that often incline subjects to erroneous predictions of their 
future welfare, and behavioral biologists and cognitive neuroscien-
tists are contributing to a deeper understanding of the causes and 
consequences of these errors.77
There is also a signifi cant difference between economics and 
behavioral biology in the dangerous ease with which people move 
from positive analysis to normative conclusions. To derive a prescrip-
tive “ought” solely from a descriptive “is” is generally to commit a 
logical error sometimes referred to as the “naturalistic fallacy.”78 To 
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79 Kaldor- Hicks effi ciency is sometimes described as “potential Pareto effi ciency”. 
If side payments from winners to losers could be made, a Kaldor- Hicks effi cient change 
could be converted into a Pareto effi cient change. But the side payments are not made 
and changes can be Kaldor- Hicks effi cient even though some parties are worse off for 
the change.
80 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 48 (Pearson Addison Wesley, 
4th ed. 2004).
81 To take a different example, suppose that the government has a house that it 
does not need any longer and which it decides to give away. Only two citizens want 
the house, a poor woman and a rich man. Suppose the government knows that the 
woman would value the house at exactly $10,000 and the man would value the house 
at exactly $50,000. If the house is given to the man, it would be possible for the man to 
pay the woman $30,000 and make both of them happier than if the house were given to 
the woman. Since it would be possible for the winner to make such a payment, award-
ing the house to the rich man is the effi cient choice, according to the Kaldor- Hicks 
test, even if that transfer payment is never made. Now suppose, in addition, that the 
poor woman would get more utility out of the house than the rich man. In such a case, 
the effi cient decision under the Kaldor- Hicks concept of effi ciency is at odds with the 
decision that will generate the greater increase in happiness.
Moreover, what do we mean when we say that a change will make people better 
or worse off? Maybe we are talking about monetary wealth, maybe peace of mind, 
maybe personal security. If we leave the objective unspecifi ed, then it is easier to be 
convinced by the normative analysis that follows. But sometimes economists too get 
accused of turning their positive analysis into contentious normative claims. Sup-
pose, for example, that a rapist can get so much positive utility from a rape that his 
benefi ts exceed the costs to the rape victim. The rape is Kaldor- Hicks effi cient, and 
yet virtually no one believes as a normative matter that the rape should be legal, let 
alone encouraged.
put it in economic terms, it is not necessarily the case that effi ciency 
should always be furthered, given that it could come at the cost of 
more important competing goals. However, it is easy to slide from the 
descriptive to the prescriptive. For example, a change that improves 
the lives of individuals might not be a good thing if it harms the col-
lective. Some, perhaps especially some in other, less individualistic 
cultures, might be willing to argue that the unit that matters is the 
social unit, the tribe or nation, rather than the individual. Discus-
sions about what is effi cient make it hard for such views to fi nd a 
place in the normative conversation because they are outside the 
traditional economic calculus.
Moreover, many effi ciency arguments are grounded in Kaldor-
 Hicks effi ciency. Changes are Kaldor- Hicks effi cient if total benefi ts 
exceed total costs.79 A change can be effi cient under this defi nition 
even though some individuals will be made worse off by the change.80 
Additionally, this notion of effi ciency requires that the evaluator 
compare losses of one person to gains of another. It might be effi cient, 
for example, for the government to make a poor person a bit worse off 
in order to make a rich person a lot better off.81 Since law and econom-
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82 The Kaldor- Hicks criterion is obviously normative. Not only can it be put to pre-
scriptive purposes, it seems to have been designed for use in normative analysis. One 
positive purpose to which the Kaldor- Hicks defi nition can be put is in the hypothesis 
that a branch of government behaves in a such way as to achieve Kaldor- Hicks effi -
ciency. For example, one might argue that common law courts come to rules that are 
effi cient in that sense. See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Aspen, 
7th ed. 2007). It is not a large step from that hypothesis, however, to the argument that 
the common law rules are good rules. There is no corresponding normative standard 
in biology.
83 Social Darwinism (more properly “Social Spencerism”, see Jones & Goldsmith, 
at 492-94 (cited in note 4)) no longer has much support among those who make or 
infl uence policy. But this should raise a cautionary fl ag for law and economics. If 
policy makers could make the stupefying leap from what is reproductive to what is 
good, it should be all the easier to make the seemingly smaller jump from what is 
effi cient to what is good. One lesson that we might take from the biologists’ caution 
is to better question the assumptions regarding preferences, costs, and benefi ts that 
underlie the effi ciency analysis used in economics.
84 Note, too, that the subjects of economics (effi cient regulation of markets, for 
example) frequently evoke less emotional reactions than reproductive biology (for ex-
ample, children). This may be one more reason why the assumptions of the economist 
are more likely to remain unobserved by the student than are the assumptions of the 
biologist.
ics analysis often applies, whether expressly or impliedly, the Kaldor-
 Hicks criterion, policy makers ought not jump from the statement that 
a change is effi cient to the conclusion that the change is desirable.82 
However, “effi ciency” evokes such strongly favorable sentiments 
that once it is determined that choice A is more effi cient than choice 
B, many will fi nd that analysis suffi cient to justify choice A. Because 
effi ciency is like motherhood and apple pie, an analysis that shows 
one law to be more effi cient than another law as a matter of positive 
analysis also has assumed normative implications even though the 
logical connection has not been established. There is, at least today,83 
no correspondingly seductive connection between what is reproduc-
tively successful and what is “good”. Therefore, it is much easier to 
avoid the mistake of drawing a normative implication from a bio-
logical description. For example, reproductive success may be “good” 
for organisms and genes. But those who try to make the unwarranted 
jump to the conclusion that policies that would increase reproductive 
success should be pursued for that reason will immediately be asked 
to explain why this is so. Whereas the very idea of “effi ciency” sounds 
normatively attractive (who argues for the virtue of ineffi ciency?), the 
normative implication of reproduction, in contrast, is obviously con-
textually embedded, and lacking in universal appeal.84
Economics and biology also approach the subject of change rather 
differently. Earlier we treated innovation and mutation as similar 
concepts precisely because each enables models of humans and 
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85 See Part IV.A.
86 Some current critics of Darwinism rely on an old “watchmaker” argument for 
the existence of God, an argument that Darwin himself rebutted. The essence of the 
argument is that anatomical features that perform certain functions so well must have 
been designed to do so by some designer, just as a watch must have been designed by 
a watchmaker. See David Hume, Dialogues Pt. II; William Paley, Natural Theology 
(Printed for Daniel and Samuel Whiting, 6th ed 1803). The argument is an evolved 
form of one that dates back at least to Cicero. “When you see a sundial or a water-
 clock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you 
imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it 
embraces everything, including the artifacts themselves and the artifi cers.” Cicero, as 
quoted in Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (Simon & Schuster 1995) at 
29 n 5. See also, Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (Norton 1986).
87 For a discussion of movement between local optima and their limitations in 
biology, see Timothy H. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Human Nature: Forging 
Links Between Evolution and Behavior 34 (Oxford 1991).
88 Dawkins is reported to have said something to the effect of: No one would expect 
pigs to sprout wings, notwithstanding that they could come in handy from time to 
time. Relatedly, see Kam Patel, Going the Whole Hog, The Times Higher Education 
Supplement (Apr 28, 1995) (interviewing Richard Dawkins).
human behavior to incorporate change.85 But the changes occur 
differently in each realm. Consider fi rst innovation: a good idea can 
often quickly induce long- lasting and productive change. This is 
less true in biology, where all genetically heritable changes are, with 
the exception of modern technological manipulations, the function 
of genetic mutation or recombination. Natural selection may sort 
genes and genetic combinations. But nature does not create new ones 
as a function of some perceived opportunity. And humans cannot, at 
least without signifi cant technological advancement, create signifi -
cant genetic changes for the species by consciously responding to 
new opportunities. In short, in biology, there is no watchmaker; in 
economics there is.86
Because economically relevant change is easier for humans, eco-
nomic behavior is more easily modifi ed by moving directly between 
local optima than is biological behavior change. For example, a car 
company might entirely abandon one method of supplying its facto-
ries to instead imitate another company’s more successful method. 
In contrast, evolutionary biologists tend to study changes in behavior 
that are unlikely to refl ect movement directly between local optima. 
The biological constraint stems from the fact that organisms are path 
dependent and unlikely to move to a suboptimal position, even if it 
might eventually lead to a superior local optimum, and from the fact 
that organisms can only work with the variability genetics supplies,87 
not with the variability that a good idea or experienced need might 
recommend.88
Another difference between economics and biology revolves 
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89 See, for example, Richard Epstein, A Taste for Privacy?: Evolution and the Emer-
gence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J Leg Stud 665 (1980); Richard Epstein, The Varieties 
of Self- Interest, 8 Social Phil & Pol 102 (1990).
90 See, for example, Mark Grady & M.T. McGuire, A Theory of the Origin of Natural 
Law, 8 J Contemp Legal Issues 87 (1997); Mark Grady & M.T. McGuire, The Nature of 
Constitutions, 1 J Bioeconomics 227 (1999).
91 See, for example, Richard Posner, Sex and Reason (Harvard 1992).
around the concept of consumption. It was pointed out above that 
the idea of investment is critically important to both disciplines. 
However, the idea of individual consumption—just for its own 
sake—is not similarly shared. From the biological point of view, any 
deployment of resources that does not contribute directly or indi-
rectly to reproduction (at least of relatives) is arguably wasteful. And 
animals that engage in wasteful behaviors may in the long run, be 
less reproductive than contemporaries inclined to behave more effi -
ciently. If so, heritable inclinations toward less productive behavior 
risk being wiped out by the economizing force of natural selection. 
Consequently, whereas economists are comfortable contemplating 
tradeoffs between consumption and investment, biologists generally 
continue to analyze only tradeoffs among investments.
These differences between economics and biology, and others like 
them, underscore why economists and biologists do not always see 
eye to eye, and why it would be a mistake to assume that biological 
and economic insights will always converge.
I V.  L AW  &  E C O N O M I C S  M E E T S  L AW  & 
B E H AV I O R A L  B I O L O G Y
Against the background of the prior Part, we can now consider the 
similarities and differences between the intersection of law and eco-
nomics, on one hand, and law and behavioral biology, on the other.
A. Similarities
Obviously, the core similarities of the underlying disciplines dis-
cussed in Part III generate similarities in the ways that each fi eld 
intersects with law. Beyond those already mentioned, there are a few 
additional similarities to note.
Because both economics and behavioral biology develop theo-
retical constructs for explaining and predicting human behaviors, 
each subfi eld of law attracts scholars interested in improving law’s 
functioning by applying or even improving its theories of human 
behavior. Not surprisingly, then, there are some key overlapping 
personnel. For example, a number of prominent law and economics 
scholars—such as Richard Epstein,89 Mark Grady,90 Richard Posner,91 
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92 See, for example, Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Effi cient?, 6 J Leg 
Stud 51 (1977) reprinted in Paul Rubin, ed, The Evolution of Effi cient Common Law 
(Edward Elgar 2007); Paul Rubin, Darwinian Politics: The Evolutionary Origin of Free-
dom (Rutgers 2003).
93 This evidence is illustrative, but imperfect. First, it would be useful to also know 
percentage trends, which would require correction for differences from year to year in 
the total number of law review articles published. (That is, the number of articles com-
bining these terms could be increasing at the same time that the percentage combining 
them is decreasing.) Second, the search term is very rough. It is likely over- inclusive 
in some ways, and under- inclusive in others. For an article combining law, economics, 
and evolutionary biology, see for example Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics, 109 Harv L Rev 641 (1996).
and Paul Rubin92—have already drawn attention in legal contexts to 
important parallels between economics and biology. And the annual 
number of articles in law that mention biology, evolution, and eco-
nomics in the same piece, in one way or another, shows a nearly con-
stantly upward trend, by year, with roughly 1418 law review articles 
in 2008 alone.93 (See Figure 1.)
Because each subfi eld of law seeks a unifying theory for both human 
behavior and law, each sparks concerns about possible disciplinary 
imperialism. This inevitably raises suspicions of political motives, 
which have been compounded in part by the openly conservative 
perspectives of some of the scholars just mentioned. Indeed, some 
skeptics of law and biology have expressed concern that the study 
of human behavioral biology might somehow inherently appeal to 
Figure 1. Articles in Westlaw “Journals & Law Reviews” Database. Search term: 
dates (is [year]) & evol! & biolog! & econ!
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94 This was, for example, one of the major concerns expressed at a conference on 
behavioral biology and feminism, at Emory University Law School, in December 2006. 
(And this may have refl ected in part the perception, signalled in the conference Call 
for Papers, that law and economics scholars may be especially prone to fi nd evolu-
tionary perspectives appealing; the Call for Papers had indicated that a key topic of 
inquiry should be: “The relationship between evolutionary biology and economics, and 
between the emerging fi eld of “Law and Evolution” and the established fi eld of Law and 
Economics.”) Moreover, the possible relationship between biology and conservatism 
has garnered continuing attention in both academic and media outlets. See, for example, 
A Split Emerges as Conservatives Discuss Darwin, New York Times, May 5, 2007.
95 Monahan (cited in note 2).
those with a penchant to politicize issues.94 Will conservative schol-
ars turn to law and behavioral biology as a tool, to be deployed in 
ways consistent with (broadly speaking) conservative agendas? 
Or reciprocally, for that matter, will liberal scholars turn law and 
behavioral biology into a tool, to be deployed in ways consistent with 
(broadly speaking) liberal agendas? Our own view is that neither of 
these forms of politicization is either inevitable or desirable. As with 
law and economics, the theoretical construct and empirical insights 
derived from behavioral biology should appeal to legal scholars who 
merely wish to better understand our world, its current legal poli-
cies, and the potential impact of future policy reforms. To succeed at 
this endeavor, however, scholars in law and behavioral biology must 
proceed cautiously. We therefore revisit this issue in Part V.
Another similarity between the intersections of economics and 
biology with law concerns the diffi culty of achieving an appropriate 
balance, for legal readers, between main themes and subtle details. 
As a consequence of the interplay between main themes that are 
quickly accessible, and subtleties that are not, law and economics 
had to fi nd ways, in early years, to educate readers on the basics of a 
technical discipline, before one could then explore possible implica-
tions in legal contexts. The same is true for law and biology. Striking 
the right balance is more challenging than it might fi rst appear, and 
more important than its inherently procedural nature may sound, 
given the subtleties that must inevitably be skipped in summariz-
ing fundamentals, the need to repeat key concepts for those new to 
the topic, and the limitations on space and reader patience for back-
ground information before getting to interesting applications.
As John Monahan has argued in overview,95 both law and behav-
ioral biology, on one hand, and law and economics, on the other, have 
great heuristic power, great breadth, and great depth. The similar 
heuristic power stems from the abilities of each to raise large sets of 
interconnected questions, and also to explore those questions empir-
ically. Clearly, this does not and should not dictate conclusions about 
what we should and should not do with legal policy. Yet, at the same 
time, the two interdisciplinary fi elds can each help us learn more 
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96 In law and economics, this was demonstrated most vividly by Richard Posner’s 
book Economic Analysis of Law. There are also numerous applications in law and 
behavioral biology (see www .sealsite .org). For example, Jones & Goldsmith (cited in 
note 4), catalogue, describe, and illustrate a large set of applications, including: dis-
covering useful patterns in regulable behavior; uncovering confl icts among contem-
poraneously pursued legal policies; sharpening the cost- benefi t analyses that often 
infl uence legal policymaking; clarifying links between various causal infl uences and 
their effects on human behavior; increasing our understanding about human decision-
 making; providing theoretical foundation for, and potential predictive power about, 
a variety of human behaviors; disentangling the multiple causes of various law-
 relevant behaviors; exposing a variety of unwarranted assumptions underlying legal 
approaches for inspiring behavioral changes; assessing the comparative effectiveness 
of legal strategies we employ to change specifi c behaviors; revealing deep patterns in 
legal architecture; and identifying under- noticed and unintended selection pressures 
that legal systems can themselves create.
97 See, for example, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand 
L Rev 397 (1992) (effi ciency could be advanced by requiring people to plan for divorce 
at the time of marriage); Jones & Goldsmith (cited in note 4); Maxwell L. Stearns, The 
Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 385 (1992) (using 
economic analysis to argue that a line item veto would not reduce pork barrel spending 
but might enhance the President’s infl uence over public interest legislation); Linda 
Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 Geo L J 477 (1992) (using economic anal-
ysis to argue that term limits enhance interest group infl uence on legislators); John 
J. Donohue & Peter Seigelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983, 1024 (1991) (laws against discrimination in fi r-
ing employees may increase discrimination in hiring); Jeremy Bentham, Defence of 
Usury, Shewing the Impolity of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of Pecuni-
ary Bargains in a Series of Letters to a Friend. To Which is Added a Letter to Adam 
Smith, Esq; LL.D. on the Discouragements Opposed by the Above Restraints to the 
Progress of Inventive Industry (1787) (laws against usury hurt borrowers); George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Leg Stud 1 
(1984) (whether the law is pro- plaintiff or pro- defendant cannot be determined by the 
percentage of cases won); Robert P. Albon, Lawyers and the Rental Market for Hous-
about the underlying causes of and patterns in behaviors that matter 
to us. This may thereby aid the effi cient and effective pursuit with 
legal tools of social goals already in place, and also help us better 
anticipate how various legal interventions may affect future behav-
ior in both intended and unintended ways.
The great breadth to which Monahan refers refl ects the fact that 
both interdisciplinary areas address extraordinarily wide ranges of 
behavior, with general principles of broad applicability. Because the 
theories and fi ndings of economics and behavioral biology are not 
limited to particular human activities, there is potential for utility, 
in law, across a wide range of legal contexts.96 And the great depth 
to which Monahan refers refl ects the fact that both interdisciplinary 
areas hold promise to extend far below surface generalities. These 
interdisciplinary areas provide tools that can penetrate into specifi c 
legal contexts. And, each is capable of generating sophisticated, often 
counterintuitive insights into human behavior and law.97
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ing: a Critical Appraisal or a Conversation Between two Academics in a Hotel Bar, in 
Ross Cranston and Anne Schick, eds, Law and Economics 105-11 (Australian National 
University 1982) (reforms make some tenants buy housing goods they do not want to 
buy); Daniel P. Schwallie, Note: The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Mecha-
nism for Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 Case W Res L Rev 525 
(1989-90) (law reform may hasten withdrawal of tenant quarters from the housing 
market); Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960) (initial 
allocation of rights may not matter to effi cient allocation; and, negative externalities 
depend as much on the recipient as the source).
98 These issues are discussed in Richard A. Epstein, Skepticism and Freedom, 
141-43, 194-227 (Chicago 2003); Jones, Time- Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s 
Leverage (cited in note 6).
99 Jonathan Haidt, Rapporteur, Group Report: What Is the Role of Heuristics in 
Making Law?, in Gerd Gigerenzer & Christopher Engel, eds, Heuristics and the Law 
239, 241-43 (MIT 2006).
100 See generally, Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in 
Humans and Other Animals (Harvard U Press, 1996); Jonathan Haidt & Craig Joseph, 
3 The Moral Mind in The Innate Mind, 367 (P. Carruthers, S. Laurence & S. Stich, 
B. Differences
As with the similarities, the core differences between economics and 
behavioral biology also seem to generate differences in the ways in 
which each fi eld intersects with law. For example, because econom-
ics has long focused on human behavior, economic concepts can be 
easily transported to the human context without objection by legal 
academics. In contrast, because behavioral biology has only more 
recently focused on the biological underpinnings of human behavior, 
it is natural for legal academics to initially question its fundamental 
applicability to law.
Moreover, in particular legal contexts, one fi eld’s tools can be rela-
tively more useful than the other’s. For example, law and economics 
holds the promise of analyses that translate a specifi c change in one 
thing (say, minimum wage, or a tax on gasoline) into a specifi c change 
in another (say, the unemployment rate, or consumption of gasoline 
and purchase of SUVs). In contrast, law and behavioral biology will 
do relatively less well at predicting changes in modern law, econo-
mies, and other cultural environments. At the same time, behavioral 
biology is relatively better equipped to explain preferences (as well as 
changes in preferences) and to both explain and predict some of the 
human behaviors those preferences generate. For example, biology is 
better at explaining why some behaviors are relatively unresponsive 
to marginal legal changes. Moreover, the biological models do a better 
job of both explaining and predicting behaviors within families than 
do the purely individualistic economic models. And, evolutionary 
insights help make sense of seemingly unstable preferences, behav-
ioral anomalies,98 heuristic thought processes,99 and moral behaviors 
and judgments.100
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77 Chi L Rev 1633 (2010). For discussion, see Walter Sinnott- Armstrong, ed, The Evo-
lution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness (MIT 2008).
101 See generally Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses 
of Human Heredity (Knopf 1985); Elof Axel Carlson, The Unfi t: A History of a Bad 
Idea (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory 2001).
102 For discussion of why behavioral biology offers no support for eugenic policies, 
see Jones & Goldsmith, at 494-95 (cited in note 4).
103 For a concise historical overview of law and economics, see Keith N. Hylton, 
Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 Md L Rev 85 
(2005).
104 Journals include the Journal of Law and Economics; the Journal of Legal Studies; 
The American Law and Economics Review; The Supreme Court Economic Review; 
the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; the International Review of Law and 
Economics; Review of Law and Economics; the European Journal of Law and Econom-
ics; Research in Law and Economics; Journal of Competition Law and Economics; 
Journal of International Economic Law; Antitrust Law and Economics Review; and 
The Economics of Legal Relationships.
Because fi tness maximization has fewer normative implications 
than does wealth maximization, as mentioned earlier, the possible 
legal policy implications of behavioral biology will very rarely seem 
as evident as they will for economics. On the other hand, behavioral 
biology may sometimes explain more usefully than economics why 
humans often behave in law- relevant ways that seem contrary to 
utility maximization (at least in the sense that law and economics 
scholars typically invoke the term).
Finally, because the historical political baggage that biology and 
economics contend with differs, the core criticisms of each of their 
intersections with law also differ. The economic focus on increasing 
total welfare (the size of the pie) at the expense of distributional con-
cerns has led to accusations that when legal policymakers listen to 
economists the result is an exacerbation of the stratifi cation of eco-
nomic wealth. In contrast, biology must contend with having been 
misinvoked for, but nonetheless associated with, genocidal move-
ments. Specifi cally, the genocidal activities of former Nazi Germany 
(themselves a refl ection of eugenic policies openly adopted earlier 
in the United States101) have cast a long shadow over any attempt to 
use insights from biology for purposes that overlap in any way with 
governmental (and in this case legal) aims.102
Several additional, signifi cant differences between law and eco-
nomics and law and behavioral biology stem from differences in the 
age and maturity of the two subfi elds. Law and economics started as a 
movement several decades ago,103 and, as is common to more mature 
fi elds, law and economics has more readily available grant money, 
a variety of scholarly journals,104 and other accessories of interdis-
ciplinary arenas that are both maturely developed and widely sub-
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and Economics Association website, online at http:// www .amlecon .org/ links .html 
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109 For example, in 2007 the MacArthur Foundation initiated a $10,000,000 project 
on Law and Neuroscience. See http:// www .lawneuro .org.
110 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 23 (Aspen, 6th ed 2002).
scribed.105 Law and economics has benefi tted not only from advocacy 
by the amazingly prolifi c writing of Richard Posner and others, but 
also from the entrepreneurial skills of Henry Manne and the eco-
nomic clout of the Olin Foundation. Manne created highly successful 
retreats, informally dubbed “Pareto in the Pines,” for law professors 
and judges, and has written about building law and economics as an 
institutional movement.106 Olin, for its part, sponsored law and eco-
nomics programs around the country, providing scholars with both 
the time and incentives to do law and economics oriented work.
Early efforts in law and behavioral biology did not spread as 
quickly. However, continuing collaborations within and between the 
Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research107 and the Society 
for Evolutionary Analysis in Law108 have sparked substantial, steady, 
and continuing scholarly interest, and increasing fl ows of grant 
money have begun to support developments in law and behavioral 
biology.109
The fi eld of law and behavioral biology is developing more slowly 
than did law and economics, and will probably continue to do so, 
because not only are there far more lawyers with economic training 
than with biology training (let alone training in behavioral biology), 
far more legal thinkers are trained in the social sciences than in the 
life sciences. Moreover, in law and economics, some of the founda-
tional works were written by economists interested in law, while 
law tends to hold considerably less appeal for biologists. Last, many 
of the questions fi rst raised by law and economics were low- hanging 
fruit; fi elds such as antitrust, securities, corporations, contracts, tax, 
and the regulation of explicit economic markets were all self- evident 
candidates for applying the economic microscope.110 And, unsurpris-
ingly, the fi elds where law and economics is most fully developed 
remain those like antitrust, whereas economics has had less develop-
ment and infl uence in other fi elds. On fi rst glance, it would appear 
that there are fewer fi elds in law offering low- hanging fruit to biolo-
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2001); Lee Cronk, et al, eds, Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropologi-
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McGuire & Alfonso Troisi, Darwinian Psychiatry (Oxford 1998); Anthony Stevens 
& John Price, Evolutionary Psychiatry: A New Beginning (Routledge 2000); Human 
gists. Criminal law, family law, and torts come easily to mind, but 
beyond that, the applications of biology to law are often less direct 
than the applications of economics to law.111 Coase has argued that 
economics started as law and economics.112 Biology certainly did not 
start as law and biology.
V.  R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
To this point, we have surveyed the similarities and differences 
between biology and economics, and compared how law and behav-
ioral biology, as a young interdisciplinary fi eld, compares with the 
more established fi eld of law and economics. Here, we offer a variety 
of recommendations for the future to existing and new scholars 
in both fi elds (particularly the younger fi eld), as well as to those 
approaching law and biology scholarship from the outside.
 1) The study of and knowledge about the infl uences of bio-
logical processes, including evolutionary, behavioral 
genetic, and neuroscientifi c ones, on human behavior has 
grown dramatically in recent decades. Prior debates about 
the extent of these infl uences on human behavior, particu-
larly in the 1970s and 1980s,113 did little to stem the accel-
erating growth of the underlying scientifi c work. For ex-
ample, evolutionary perspectives on human behavior have 
appeared with increasing frequency not only in biology, but 
also in anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, philosophy, 
sociology, political science, and medicine.114 And reference 
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Albert Somit & Steven A. Peterson, eds, Evolutionary Approaches in the Behavioral 
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Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (Simon & Schuster 
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Darwin to Today (Cambridge 1993); Jerome H. Barkow, Missing the Revolution: Dar-
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115 Indeed, the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (S.E.A.L.) now has mem-
bers spanning 32 countries.
to and use of behavioral biology in legal scholarship has 
increased commensurately.115 (See Figure 2.) Consequently, 
it seems likely that behavioral biology perspectives on law-
 relevant human behaviors will continue to be fruitful for 
research for a long time to come. And an investment in the 
fi eld of law and behavioral biology can therefore yield sub-
stantial rewards.
 2) Law and behavioral biology is not simply law and econom-
ics in another guise. The trajectories and implications of 
law and economics on one hand and law and behavioral 
biology on the other are not identical, despite a number of 
Figure 2. Articles in Westlaw “Journals & Law Reviews” Database. Search term: 
dates(is[year]) and (evolution! /p biolog!) or (Darwin! /pb iolog!) or (evolution /s 
psychol!) or “evolutionary biology” or “evolutionary psychology” or sociobiology or 
“behavioral biology”.
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similarities. It would therefore be a mistake to assume that 
one should process or react to invocations of behavioral 
biology in law in the same way one processes or reacts to 
invocations of economics in law.
 3) On the other hand, because the two subfi elds employ very 
similar tools, law and behavioral biology scholars should 
strive for better engagement with the law and economics 
literature, and vice versa. For example, both may benefi t 
from attending conferences of the other, and from investing 
in basic training.
 4) As with the law and economics literature, it would be a mis-
take to assume that analysts applying behavioral biology 
share a common purpose, a common (or any) political 
agenda, common methods, or common views on implica-
tions. Scholars exploring the possible uses of behavioral 
biology in law do so for a wide variety of different reasons, 
and come to this particular interdisciplinary intersection 
with diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and purposes. As 
is always the case, different people have different opinions 
about the implications or non- implications of biology to 
issues that matter to law. Those of us interested in the 
biology of behavior are diverse in views. The works of each 
scholar should be evaluated independently.
 5) There is nothing inherently political about behavioral 
biology.116 As has by now often been said in this context, 
explanation is not justifi cation, and description is not pre-
scription. There is no way to reach a normative conclusion 
from processes or facts of biology without incorporating 
other values.
 6) Nevertheless, it is probably safe to assume that some number 
of conservative scholars will—intentionally or otherwise—
deploy arguments invoking behavioral biology in further-
ance of various conservative agendas.117 Readers should (as 
with all scholarship) approach law and biology scholarship 
with a balance of skepticism and open- mindedness.
 7) At the same time, the wide variety of scholars who have 
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written evolutionary analyses in law include those from 
across the political spectrum, from those who would self-
 identify as conservatives to those who self- identify as liber-
als, feminists, or the like. So it is probably also safe to assume 
that some number of liberal scholars will—intentionally or 
otherwise—deploy arguments invoking behavioral biology 
in furtherance of various liberal agendas.118 Again, both 
skepticism and open- mindedness are appropriate.
 8) There is a long history, to which we should closely attend, 
of biology being misused in furtherance of agendas incon-
sistent with legal equality between the sexes. It is entirely 
appropriate that this give us pause. But, to be clear, this 
recommends skepticism, rather than antagonism or refl ex-
ive rejection. For even if the differences between sexes that 
recur in biology make misuse a recurring problem, this is 
a situation in which the best defense to misuse is a deeper 
knowledge about, and continuing inquiry into, the effects 
of evolutionary processes on behavior generally, and the 
crucial interplay of genetic and environmental infl uences, 
specifi cally. In any event, the risks of harms from misuse 
should, if possible, be weighed on a case-by-case basis 
against the risks of forgone benefi ts from nonuse.
 9) As was true for law and economics scholars, those schol-
ars new to law and behavioral biology should take care to 
engage the primary literature on the topic, not just popular 
accounts, in efforts to avoid mistakes of over- simplifi cation. 
It will often be useful to co-author or to vet manuscripts 
with biologists, evolutionists, and others with relevant 
training.
10) It is essential to understand behavioral biology if one is to 
critique it. Although this requires an investment in time, 
the fundamentals of the discipline are accessible to those 
willing to study it. Too often, critics who might have offered 
something constructive miss their mark by assuming to be 
true things (about behavioral biology, or the views of schol-
ars mining it) that are not.
11) The infl uences of biological processes on human behavior 
are frequently controversial, frequently misunderstood, 
frequently misdescribed, and sometimes misapplied. This 
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is, perhaps, inevitable. For one thing, the social sciences 
and the life sciences have proceeded on separate disciplin-
ary tracks for generations. For another, although the infl u-
ences of biological processes are increasingly understood, it 
is unlikely that they will ever be perfectly understood. After 
all, there are profound complexities inherent to a discipline 
that deals in genetically and developmentally unique organ-
isms (in contrast to the case in physics, for example). Add in 
the challenges of trying to use insights from any technical 
discipline in an area as subtle as law—particularly one that 
has sometimes been misused in the past—and discussions 
quickly get complicated.
12) Those interested in law and behavior may fi nd it useful to 
stay informed of developments in the area. A good way to do 
this is to join S.E.A.L.—the Society for Evolutionary Anal-
ysis in Law (www .sealsite .org). Not only does the organiza-
tion help distribute information about recent scholarship, 
it also hosts annual scholarship conferences at which to 
present and discuss ideas.
13) When generating research ideas, law and behavioral biology 
scholars should strive for consilience119 by weaving together 
insights from biology and economics that come from their 
common tools. Not only is consilience an important end in 
itself, for the increased usefulness that decreased inconsis-
tencies can bring, but this exercise can also frame behav-
ioral biology discussions more accessibly for readers.
14) While there are numerous overlaps between economics 
and biology, behavioral biology has much to contribute 
on its own terms. Scholars should identify those places 
where behavioral biology adds insights that economics 
failed to identify. Research ideas might include (but are by 
no means limited to) insights into preferences and insights 
into so-called “sticky” (change- resistant) behaviors, in par-
ticular those often evident in the contexts of family law, 
sexuality and reproduction, and criminal law.
15) As law and economics scholars recognized, an understanding 
of tradeoffs, including opportunity costs, is important. Any 
comprehensive theory of human behavior must acknowl-
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edge and incorporate competing conceptual ideas. In eco-
nomics, for example, actors face a tradeoff between their 
preferences for consumption and leisure, and, as a result 
of that tradeoff, most humans engage in some but limited 
leisure. In the context of behavioral biology, evolutionary 
predispositions lend insights into human behavior, but so 
does the amazing plasticity of the brain (and the behavioral 
plasticity it is capable of generating). Similarly, although 
it might be useful to model humans as agents striving to 
maximize both their inclusive fi tness and their material 
resources, they also ultimately confront tradeoffs between 
the two. Moreover, the attainment of either is sometimes 
subject to constraints generated by a need to survive within 
one’s social group (i.e., avoid ostracism). Much interesting 
work can be generated by exploring these tradeoffs, and 
their implications for legal policy.
16) Law and behavioral biology should avoid the imperialistic 
aspirations that plagued some early law and economics 
scholars. No one fi eld possesses a monopoly on valuable 
insights regarding human behavior. Instead, important 
insights into behavior often result from combining insights 
from multiple fi elds (as Darwin, Friedman, Alchian, Triv-
ers, and Maynard Smith did).
17) Similarly, law and behavioral biology scholars should avoid 
overclaiming the extent to which its tools are useful to law. 
No fi eld can answer all questions of legal policy, and the 
success of the discipline could turn on avoiding the implau-
sible and, ideally, beginning with clear applications.
18) Finally, because the low- hanging fruit in law and economics 
has all been plucked, there are signifi cant opportunities in 
law and behavioral biology with potentially greater returns 
for scholars already familiar with law and economics. There 
are enormously expansive territories in law and behavioral 
biology that remain unexplored, with the consequence that 
law and behavioral biology is growing and accelerating. 
The extent of useful work yet to be done vastly exceeds 
the work that already has been done. There are opportuni-
ties, here, for people with the commitment and interest to 
explore entire subfi elds of law (such as torts, family law, 
and criminal law) through the lens of behavioral biology. 
Along the way, scholars in law and behavioral biology can 
borrow from the economic methodologies that already have 
been translated into the legal literature. In tackling law and 
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behavioral biology, the law and economics scholars there-
fore will often enjoy a competitive advantage.
V I .  C O N C L U S I O N
This article has provided a very brief overview of the similarities 
and differences between economics and behavioral biology, as well 
as between the related intersections of law and economics on one 
hand, and law and behavioral biology on the other. To the question 
with which we opened (might law and biology be the next law and 
economics?) we offer an unequivocal yes and no. We have identifi ed 
important overlaps, as well as important differences—both in the 
substance of the disciplines themselves and also in the pathways for 
incorporation into legal thinking.
We believe that the overlaps between economics and biology 
warrant even greater congress between these two disciplines, and 
expanded exchange between the legal thinkers interested in each of 
them. We also believe that the differences between economics and 
biology warrant individualized attention to each, particularly to 
the comparatively under- explored ways in which the infl uence of 
biological processes on human brains and behaviors are relevant to 
achieving, as effi ciently and effectively as feasible, the goals society 
assigns to law.
